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FIRST AMENDMENT-OBSCENITY AND INDECENCY
Pinkus v. United States, 98 S. Ct. 1808 (1978)
Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation. 98 S. Ct. 3026 (1978)
INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court last term attempted to define further the standards for determining the obscenity vel non of mailed materials. In Pinkus v.
United Statesi the Court ruled, inter alia, that children are not to be included as a part of the
community by whose standards obscenity is to be
judged. However, the inclusion of sensitive adults
was considered proper in the formulation of that
community standard. Also, in Federal Communica-

tions Commission v. Pacifica Foundation,2 the Court
held that the Federal Communications Commission had the power to regulate the content and
context of a radio broadcast which was indecent
but not obscene.
DiscussioN OF CASES

In Pinkus, the Court sought to resolve the ambiguities surrounding the definition of "contemporary community standards," as used by the Court
in Roth v. United States to define obscene materials."
The Roth standards for obscenity, as particularized
in Memoirs v. Massachusetts,5 stated that materials
could be found obscene when: (a) the dominant
theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to
a prurient interest in sex; (b) the material is patently offensive because it affronts contemporary
community standards relating to the description or
representation of sexual matters; and (c) the ma6
terial is utterly without redeeming social value.
The Court redefined obscenity in Miller v. Cali' 98 S. Ct. 1808 (1978).
298 S. Ct. 3026 (1978).
3354 U.S. 476 (1957).
4 The acts with which Pinkus was charged, infra note
12, occurred prior to the decision of Miller v. California,
413 U.S. 15 (1973), making the Roth-Memoirs standards
applicable to that case. See Marks v. United States, 430
U.S. 188 (1977), holding "that the Due Process Clause
[of the Fifth Amendment] precludes the application to
petitioners of the standards announced in Miller v. California, to the extent that those standards may impose
criminal liability for conduct not punishable under Mem-

oirs. "Id. at 196.
r383 U.S. 413 (1966).
6
Id. at 418.

fornia 7 finding the "utterly without redeeming social value" requirement of Roth and its progeny to
be a prosecutorial burden "virtually impossible to
discharge under our criminal standards of proof."8
Under the present day Miller standards, the trier of
fact in an obscenity case must determine:
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary community standards" would find that the
work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient
interest... (b) whether the work depicts or describes
in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c)
whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political or scientific value?
The petitioner in Pinkus v. United States'? was
charged with violation of a federal obscenity statute."1 The acts upon which the charges were based
occurred in 197 1,12 necessitating the application of
the Roth'3 standards to the determination of obscenity vel non. 4 The district court failed to apply
the Roth standards, 5 and cast its instructions to the
7413 U.S. 15 (1973).
8

Id. at 22.

9Id. at 24 (citations omitted).

1098 S. Ct. 1808.
1 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1976) in relevant part provides:
Every obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy or
vile article, matter, thing, device or substance...
Is declared to be nonmailable matter and shall
not be conveyed in the mails or delivered from any
post office or by any letter carrier.
Whoever knowingly uses the mails for the mailing,
carriage in the mails, or delivery of anything declared by this section ...to be nonmailable... shall
be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not
more than five years, or both, for the first such
offense, and shall be fined not more than $10,000 or
imprisoned not more than ten years, or both, for
each such offense thereafter.
12The 11 count indictment charged Pinkus with having: "mailed obscene illustrated brochures advertising sex
films, books, magazines and playing cards; the magazine
'Bedplay'; and an 8 mm. film, 'No. 613,' to addresses in
Nevada, New York, Iowa, Pennsylvania, Texas, and New
Jersey." United States v. Pinkus, 551 F. 2d 1155, 1156 n.
I (9th Cir. 1977).
13 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
14See note 4 supra.
1598 S. Ct. at 1810. The District Court's decision was
not published.
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16
jury in a definition of obscenity under the Miller
standards. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit remanded the case 17 to the district court for a new trial under the appropriate
standards. On retrial in 1976, petitioner was again
convicted, fined and sentenced on the original
charges.18 On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, petitioner challenged four parts of thejury instructions
and the trial court's exclusion of assertedly comparable materials, which were claimed to have had
enjoyed commerial and popular success throughout the country. That court affirmed the conviction, finding no reversible error in the jury instructions.' 9 In upholding one instruction which included children as a part of the community by
whose standard obscenity was to have been judged,
the circuit court noted that the "Supreme Court
has both upheld a conviction involving the inclusion of children in the community [see Roth v. United
I and intimated that it
States, 345 U.S. 476 ....
does not necessarily approve such a charge. See
Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 465 n.3 ...
(1966).' '
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the
case back to the court of appeals, acknowledging
its prior ambivalence on whether children should
be included in the relevant community. The majority opinion 2' held that children are not to be
included in the relevant community and reasoned
that their inclusion might produce in the jury's eye
a much lower "average person"' 2 than would result
if they "restricted their consideration to the effect
2
of allegedly obscene materials on aduts." 3 The
Court observed that in the same term in which

16413 U.S. 15 (1973).
" United States v. Pinkus, No. 73-2900 (9th Cir. Feb.
5, 1975, rehearing denied May 13, 1975).
1898 S. Ct. 1810. The District Court's decision was not
published.
' 9 United States v. Pinkus, 551 F. 2d 1155 (9th Cir.
1977). Pinkus challenged those jury instructions which
included children and sensitive persons as part of the
relevant community, as well as the instruction to consider
the material's appeal to the prurient interest of deviant
groups and the appellant's alleged involvement in the
business of pandering.
20Id at 1158.
" The Court's opinion was written by Chief Justice
Burger and joined by Justices Blackmun, Rehnquist and
White. Justice Stewart concurred in a separate opinion,
as did Justice Brennan, who was joined by Justices Stewart and Marshall. Justice Powell filed a dissenting opinion.
' The Court held, interalia, in Smith v. United States,
431 U.S. 291, 304 (1977), that, "obscenity is to be judged
the community, rather
according to the average person idf
than the most prudish or the most tolerant."
2' 98 S.Ct. at 1812.

Roth was decided, it had reversed a conviction
under a state statute proscribing the dissemination
of a book "found to have a potentially deleterious
influence upon youth." 24 The decision in Pinkus
followed the logic of that ruling'4 by preventing
the content of adult material from being governed
by the community's concern for the protection of
the morals of youth;2 6 or, as Mr. Justice Frankstated, "burn[ing] the house
furter euphemistically
'7
to roast the pig.'
However, the Pinkus Court did not find error in
the inclusion of sensitive adults in the jury instructions defining the relevant community by whose
standards obscenity is to be judged. The Court
found petitioner's reliance on passages from Miller
and Smith v. United States?4 to have been misplaced.
The Court ruled that the allusions to the "average
person" in those passages 30 was to emphasize an
issue central to Roth, that "judging obscenity by
the effect of isolated passages upon the most susceptible persons, might well encompass material
legitimately treating with sex, and so it must be
rejected as unconstitutionally restrictive of the freedom of speech and press." 3 ' The Court held that
'
"[i]n the narrow and limited context of this case,
the community includes all adults who comprise
it." 33 Whereas a jury should not use any particularly sensitive or insensitive persons or groups as a
standard, it should include both the sensitive and
insensitive person, however defined,' when determining the "collective view of the community.'"
The petitioner in Pinkus also challenged the propriety of the trial court's instructions as to deviant
I rd (citing Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383
(1957)).
25Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
26 There was no evidence in Pinkus that children had
received, or were likely to have received, the challenged
materials. 98 S. Ct. at 1812.
"352 U.S. at 383.
28413 U.S. 15 (1971).

29431 U.S. 291 (1977).
30 413 U.S. at 33; 431 U.S. at 304. Both the Miller and
Smith Courts held, interatia, that the community standard
was to be based on the "average person" in the community and not on the most sensitive or insensitive person.
354 U.S. at 489.
Although the Court did not explicitly state what the
"narrow and limited context of this case" was, reference
may have been made to the fact that children and
unconsenting adults were not exposed to the mailed
materials.
3398 S.Ct. at 1813.
34 The Court did not attempt to define the terms
"sensitive" and "insensitive" person, leaving that determination to the discretion of the individual jurors.
3598 S. Ct. at 1813.
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groups and pandering.3 7 He had contended that
to support an instruction on the material's appeal
to the prurient interests of deviants, the prosecution
must come forward with evidence to guide the jury
in the application of such an instruction. The
Court disagreed, however, and held that ParisAdult
Theatre I v. Slatons required the prosecution to
introduce expert testimony only where the "contested materials are directed at such a bizarre
deviant group that the experience of the trier of
fact would be plainly inadequate to judge whether
the material appeals to the [particular] prurient
interest. 3 9 The Court found that the materials
involved in Pinkus were not directed at "bizarre
deviant groups"4 ° and, accordingly, could be examined by the jurors without the aid of expert
testimony.4 1
The Court also rejected the petitioner's challenge
to the instructions that allowed the jury to consider
the setting in which the materials were presented,4 2
that is, evidence of pandering. 43 Relying on its
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decisions in Splawn v. California and Hamling v.
United States,4 5 the Court ruled that, in a close case,
ajury may consider the "touting descriptions along
with the materials themselves to determine whether
they were intended to appeal to the recipient's prurient interest in sex, [or] whether they were 'commercial exploitation of erotica-solely for the sake
of their prurient appeal., 46 The Court held, further, that the prosecution need only present the
mailings and the names, locations and occupations
of the recipients as evidence to satisfy the requirements necessary to "trigger the Ginzburg pandering
instruction. 4 7
The concurrences filed in Pinkus by Justice Stevens and by Justice Brennan, in which Justices
Stewart and Marshall joined, expressed a disfavor
with the direction of the law of obscenity. Concurring in the holding solely because the plurality had
relied faithfully on precedent and had refused to
re-examine this area of the law, Justice Stevens
reiterated the view he had expressed in past cases
concerning Section 146 I's 48 proscription of obscene
materials. Stevens has questioned the propriety of
a federal criminal obscenity statute which is applied without a uniform national standard.4 9 Stevens has also noted that, regardless of whether a
national or local standard is applicable, the "intolerably vague"' 5 constitutional standards governing
prosecutions under Section 1461 permit so much
subjectivity in the jury's determination ofobscenity
vel non that "evenhanded enforcement of the law is
a virtual impossibility.""1 For these reasons, Stevens
has concluded that the value of purportedly obscene materials should be determined in "the free
marketplace of ideas, 5 1 2 and not by means of criminal prosecutions.

3 The challenged jury instruction read in the disjunctive, stating that the materials could be found to be
obscene if they constitute an "appeal to the prurient
interest of the average person or the prurient interest of
members of a deviant sexual group at the time of mailing." Id. at 1814 (emphasis added).
37
The jury instruction on pandering stated:
You must make the decision whether the materials
are obscene under the test I have given you. In
making that determination you are not limited to
the materials themselves. In addition, you may consider the setting in which they are presented. Examples of what you may consider in this regard are
such things as: manner of distribution, circumstances
of production, sale and advertising.
United States v. Pinkus, 551 F.2d at 1159.
38413 U.S. 49 (1973). Paris involved the display of
"adult" films by a commercial movie theater, allegedly
in violation of a Georgia obscenity statute. The Court
4 431 U.S. 595 (1977). The Splawn Court held, inter
held, inter alia, that states have a "legitimate interest in alia, that, "There is no doubt that as a matter of First
regulating commerce in obscene material and in regulat- Amendment obscenity law, evidence of pandering ... is
ing exhibition of obscene material in places of public
relevant in determining whether the material is obscene."
accomodation, including so-called 'adult' theaters," and
Id. at 598.
reversed petitioner's conviction and remanded the case
4 418 U.S. at 130.
for a determination of obscenity vel non under the Miller
4698 S.Ct. at 1815 (emphasis added) (quoting Ginzstandards. Id. at 69-70.
burg v. United States, 383 U.S. at 466).
4 98 S. Ct. at 1815. Petitioner also challenged the
"Id. at 56 n.3.
40"The witness testified that there was an appeal in
exclusion of comparison evidence. The Court held that
the materials to the prurient interests of homosexuals,
in light of its disposition of the case, the issue of admissadomasochists and those interested in group sex."
sibility of comparison evidence was not before the Court.
United States v. Pinkus, 551 F.2d at 1158 n.7.
The Court noted that the fines levied against Pinkus were
4 See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 100
cumulative and left the issue of admissibility to the court
(1974), and Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463,465 of appeals.
(1966).
48
42
49 18 U.S.C. § 1461. See note 11 supra.
See note 37 supra.
See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 311
43Pandering was defined by the Ginzburg Court as "the (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
business of purveying textual or graphic matter openly
5 Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 198 (1977)
advertised to appeal to the erotic interest of their cus- (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
s1i.
tomers." 383 U.S. at 467 (quoting Roth v. United States,
52431 U.S. at 321 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also
354 U.S. 476, 495-96 (1957)) (Warren, C.J., concurring).
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Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Stewart and
Marshall, concurred in Pinkus, stating a fundamental disagreement with the Court which transcended
the facts and issues of that case. Brennan challenged the corpusjuris supporting the proscription
of obscene material. He claimed that section 1461

was "clearly overbroad and unconstitutional on its
face."' ss This, perhaps, should be read in conjunction with Justice Brennan's past statement that:
"at least in the absence of distribution to juveniles

or obtrusive exposure to unconsenting adults, the
First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit State
and Federal Governments from attempting wholly
to suppress sexually oriented materials on the basis

of their allegedly 'obscene' contents." ' 4 According
to Justice Brennan, any statute which proscribed

the sale or distribution of obscene materials to all
persons was considered overincltsive and, therefore
violated the first amendment.'
In Federal Communications Commission v. Padfica
Foundation,w the Court dealt with the relationship

between the actions taken by a regulatory agency
57
pursuant to a federal statute and the first amendments8 The respondent in the case owned and
operated a radio station which made an afternoon
broadcast of George Carlin's satiric monologue,

"Filthy Words. " ss The Commission, after forwarding a listener's complaint to the radio station and
receiving the station's response, issued a declara-

Ward v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 767, 777 (1977) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
53 98 S. Ct. at 1816 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing
Millican v. United States, 418 U.S. 947, 948 (1974)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) and United States v. Orito, 413
U.S. 139, 148 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
" Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 113
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
5 The sole dissenting opinion in Pbus was filed by
Justice Powell, who agreed with the Court that children
should not be included as part of the relevant community,
but who found such an inclusion a harmless error within
the factual context of the Pinkus case. 98 S. Ct. at 1816
(Powell, J., dissenting).
5 98 S. Ct. at 3026.
575 U.S.C. § 554(e)(1976) provides: "The agency, with
like effect as in the case of other orders, and in its sound
discretion, may issue a declaratory order to terminate a
controversy or remove uncertainty."
5 U.S. CoNsr. amend. 1.
r Carlin's monologue saterized society's attitude toward certain expletives, "the words you couldn't say on
the public, ah, airwaves, urn, the ones you definitely
wouldn't say." 98 S. Ct. at 3041 (appendix to the Court's
opinion). The expletives, as used in the monologue, did
not present an appeal to a prurient interest and, therefore,
were not found to have been obscene. Id at 3035-36.

tory order granting the complaint.' Although the
Commission did not impose formal sanctions on
the respondent for its violation of a federal statute,61 the Commission stated that the order would
be "associated with the station's license file, and in
the event that subsequent complaints are received,
the Commission will then decide whether it should
utilize any of the available sanctions it has been
' 2
granted by Congress. e After issuing the order, the
Commission declined to clarify .its opinion beyond
the "specific factual context" of the respondent's
case.' On appeal to the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia, the Commission's decision was reversed, with each of the three
4
judges on the panel writing separatelyb
In a plurality opinion6 the United States Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals in a
decision which required both statutory and constitutional interpretation. Holding that the appropri656 F.C.C.2d 94 (1975). The Commission stated in
its opinion that it sought to regulate indecent speech,
such as that found in the Carlin monologue, using principles analogous to those governing the law of nuisance
where the "law generally speaks to channeling behavior
more than actually prohibiting it." I'. at 98.
61 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976) provides: "Whoever uttcrs
any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of
radio communication shall be fined not more than
$10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both."
62 98 S. Ct. at 3030 n.1 (quoting Pacifica Foundation
v. FCC, 56 F.C.C.2d at 96). The Commission noted:
Congress has specifically empowered the FCC to (1)
revoke a station's license (2) issue a cease and desist
order, or (3) impose a monetary forfeiture for a
violation of Section 1464, 47 U.S.C. §§ 312(a).
312(b), 503(b)(l)(E). The FCC can also (4) deny
license renewal or (5)- grant a short term renewal, 47
U.S.C. §§ 307, 308.
63 59 F.C.C.2d 892, 893 (1976).
64
Pacifica Foundation v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.
1977). The opinion submitted by Judge Tamm stated
that the Commission's order constituted a form of censorship expressly prohibited by § 326 of the Communications Act. Alternatively, Judge Tamm read the Commission's opinion as the functional equivalent of an order
and found it to be "overbroad and vague." Id. at 18.
Concurring in the result, Chief Judge Bazelon founded
his objections to the Commission's order on constitutional
grounds. He concluded that § 1464 must be narrowly
construed, proscribing only that language which is obscene or otherwise unprotected by the first amendment.
Id. at 24-30. Judge Leventhal, in dissent, stated that the
state's interest in the protection of children provided a
sufficient basis for the FCC'S regulation of the language
"as broadcast." Id at 31.
s The opinion was written by Stevens, J., and joined
by Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J., Powell, J., joined by
Blackmun, J., concurred in a separate opinion. Brennan,
J., filed a dissent and was joined by Marshall, J., Stewart,
J., filed a separate dissent and was joined by Brennan,
White and Marshall, JJ.
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ate focus of review for the Court was on the Commission's determination that the Carlin monologue
was indecent as broadcast, the Court addressed

limitations on these methods of dissemination."
Therefore, the Court concluded that each of the
words of Section 1464, "obscene, indecent or protwo statutory issues: whether the Commission's
fane," was to be accorded a separate meaning by
action was forbidden censorship within the mean- the FCC in its review of public broadcasts.
ing of Section 32666 and whether speech which is
The respondent had urged that the Commisindecent, but not obscene, may be regulated under sion's construction of the statutory. language enSection 1464.7 The Court ruled that Section 326 compassed so much constitutionally-protected maof the Communications Act did not limit the Com- terial that the Commission's order was overly broad
mission's authority to impose criminal sanctions and, therefore, in violation of the first amendunder Section 1464 on licensees who are found in
ment.7'4 Writing for the plurality, 5 Justice Stevens
violation of that section. The Court based this disagreed, stating that the Court's review was limdecision on the legislative histories of these two
ited to the question of "whether the Commission
statutes, finding that Congress intended to give
has the authority to proscribe this particularbroadmeaning to both of these provisions. As the Court
cast."7 6 The plurality noted that the Commission
noted, "[r]espect for that intent requires that the had indicated that it "would not impose sanctions
censorship language be read as inapplicable to the without warnings in cases in which the applicabilprohibition on broadcasting obscene, indecent or ity of the law was unclear." Justice Stevens acprofane language."ss
knowledged that even this safeguard may result in
The Court rejected the respondent's contention some broadcasters censoring themselves in an effort
that the words "indecent" and "obscene," as used to avoid the possibility of having a broadcast
in Sections 14616 and 1464,70 must be interpreted
deemed "indecent." However, he stated that the
as proscribing only that material which appeals to Commission's order would suppress only the broada prurient interest. The Court ruled that whereas
casting of "patently offensive references to excresuch a construction was proper in the context of tory and sexual organs and activities"78 at midregulating the mails, 7i the reasoning underlying
afternoon, when children were likely to be in the
that construction was inapplicable to the public
audience. "While some of these references may be
broadcast medium. The differences which exist
protected, they surely lie
at the periphery of First
79
between the dissemination of patently offensive Amendment concern."
matter by means of personal mail and public
The plurality found no absolute first amendment
broadcast were found to justify the Commission's
protection against governmental restrictions on the
interpretation of Section 1464 as encompassing
public broadcast of indecent language "in any
more than the obscene.7 2 The Court further found
circumstances." s Rather, both the content and
that Congress had intended to impose different
'647 U.S.C. § 326 (1970) provides:
Nothing in this chapter shall be understood or construed to give the Commission the power of censorship over the radio communications or signals transmitted by any radio station, and no regulation or
condition shall be promulgated or fixed by the Commission which shall interfere with the right of free
speech by means of radio communication.
6,See note 61 supra.

6898 S.Ct. at 3034.
6918 U.S.C. § 1461. See also note 11 supra.
70 18 U.S.C. § 1464. See also note 61 supra.
7i 98 S. Ct. at 3035-36 (citing Hamling v. United
States, 418 U.S. at 99). The Hamling Court reafifined the
holding that § 1461, when applied to obscene material,
alone, does not offend the first and fifth amendments. See
also Manual Enterprises v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 483 (1962)
(Harlan, J., writing for the plurality), stating: "the statute
[§ 1461] since its inception has always been taken as
aimed at obnoxiously debasing portrayals of sex."
,-"[Wlhile a nudist magazine may be within the protection of the First Amendment ...the televising of nudes
might well raise a serious question of programming con-

trary to 18 U.S.C. § 1464." Programming Policy Statement,
44 F.C.C. 2303, 2307 (1960).
7398 S. Ct. at 3036.
7
4The first amendment overbreadth doctrine operates
to invalidate statutes which proscribe protected as well
as unprotected speech. In applying the doctrine, the
courts have refrained from considering whether the activity before them could have been prohibited under a more
narrowly drawn'statute. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413
U.S.
7 601, 610-15 (1973).
sJustice Stevens was joined in his opinion for the
plurality by Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J.
698 S. Ct. at 3037 (emphasis added).
7 Id. at 3037. See also Red Lion Broadcasting Co., Inc.
v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). There the Court held that
the unique qualities of public broadcasting supported the
constitutionality of the FCC's fairness doctrine, which
required fair and equal coverage be afforded each side of
public issues discussed over radio and television broadcasts.
7 98 S. Ct. at 3037.
79
id
soId.
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context of speech were considered critical to the
determination of first amendment protection. The
Court observed that manyforms of speech may be
regulated or proscribed by the government,8 ' and
although the first amendment guaranteed a
speaker the right to voice his opinions, a speaker
may be constitutionally limited in his choice of
words. The Court ruled that the "vulgar, offensive
and shocking"82 language of the Carlin monologue
exemplified the sort of word choice which may be
subject to governmental restriction, since "such
utterances are no essential part of any exposition
of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a
step to truth that any benefit thattmay be derived
from them is clearly outweighed by the social
interest in order and morality. ' ' ss For these reasons,
the Court concluded that the protection of such
language depended partly upon the context in
which the speech was disseminated.
The Courtss agreed with the FCC that it was
improper to broadcast Carlin's monologue at midafternoon. In so holding the Court found radio
broadcasting entitled to more limited first amendment protection than other forms of communication85 for two reasons: radio's "persuasive presence ' in the homes of many Americans, and its
unique accessibility to children.87 The Court reasoned that, because the broadcasting audience was
constantly tuning in and out, there was no way to
protect adequately the home listener or viewer
from unexpected program content. The Court concluded that the individual's right to be free from
offensive broadcasts, while in the privacy of his
home, plainly outweighed the first amendment
rights of the broadcaster of indecent materials.!8
s'1d. at 3038. The Court noted that the government
may punish the false shouting of fire in a crowded theater,
see Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919); it
may forbid speech calculated to provoke a fight, see
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); it
may differentiate between commercial speech and other
varieties, see Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350
(1977); it may treat libels against private citizens more
severely than libels against public officials, see Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); and, obscenity
may be totally proscribed, see Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15 (1973).
82 98

S. Ct. at 3039.

aId. (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. at 572).
"4Powell, J., and Blackmun, J., concurred in this part
of the Court's opinion.
8

98 S.Ct. at 3040.

Id.

88Id. (citing. Rowan v. Post Office Department, 397
U.S. 728 (1970)).

Similarly, the Court found that the government's
interest in the "well being of its youth" 9 and in
supporting "parents' claim to authority in their
own household to direct the rearing of their children"0 aptly justified the regulation of otherwise
protected materials.9
The concurring and dissenting opinions in Pacifica indicated that this "rdlatively new and difficult
area of the law 'M governing the broadcast of offensive material will continue to be met with controversy among the members of the Court. The criticisms voiced by these Justices go to the general
constitutional issues involved in the regulation of
speech.
Justice Powell's concurring opinion expressed
grave misgivings about the plurality's view of the
Court's ability to place a hierarchy of values on the
content of an expression. He stated that such a
judgment is one "for each person to make, not one
for thejudges to impose upon him."93 Powell would
have confined the basis of the decision to the
unique qualities of the broadcast media, combined
with society's interest in protecting youth from
speech "inappropriate for their years," 94 and the
privacy interest of unwilling adults in not being
"assaulted by such offensive speech in their
95
homes."
Justice Brennan, in dissent, criticized the decision on broader constitutional grounds,' finding
the Court's emphasis on the protection of children
and the privacy interest of the home listener to
have been misplaced. He focused instead on the
willing listener who, because of the Court's decision, would be prevented from obtaining a Carlintype message by means of a public, broidcast.
Brennan cited Cohen v. California,97 which held, inter
alia, that a State cannot, in consonance with the
first and fourteenth amendments, proscribe the
"simple public display ... [of a] single four-letter
s
expletive 9 8 to protect the unwilling person "from
' Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 640 (1968)'
90 Id. at 639..

91The Court noted that other forms of indecent expres-

sion may be withheld from children without restricting
the expression at its source. - U.S. at
3040."
Id at 3044 (Powell, J., concurring).
Id at 3047 (Powell, J., concurring).
94Id
96

-,

98 S. Ct. at

Justice Brennan also dissented with respect to the

Court's interpretation of § 1464, stating that the section
should be read as a prohibition of obscene speech, only.
Idat 3047 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
97403 U.S. 15 (1971).
8 Id. at 26.
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otherwise unavoidable exposure ' 99 to a "crude
form of protest."'0° He concluded that the privacy
interest asserted by the potentially unwilling audience must be invaded in an "essentially intolerable manner"' 0' to justify the suppression of otherwise protected speech. "Any broader view of this
[the government's] authority would effectively empower a majority to silence dissidents simply as a
matter of personal predilections."' 2 Brennan reasoned further that, in as much as the radio was a
public medium, an individual's decision to tune-in
at any given time could at most be viewed as an
election to participate in a public discourse; therefore, he found no fundamental privacy interest
involved in the reception of a radio broadcast.
Alternatively, Brennan concluded that even if a
privacy interest was involved, an unwilling listener's momentary exposure to the type of speech
found in the Carlin monologue did not invade that
interest in an "intolerable manner."
Justices Brennan and Marshall commended Pacifica's concern for aiding parents in the rearing of
their children, but found that basing a decision on
that concern was not mandated by precedent. Prior
decisions permitted restriction of the dissemination
to minors of otherwise protected material which
03
appealed to their prurient interests.' This, however,

was the first time that the Court had allowed
materials without a prurient appeal to be withheld
from minors. Further, Brennan and Marshall
found that the Court violated the principle of Butler
v. Michigan,1 4 which stated that the State's concern
for the protection of youth could not justify a
statute which reduced the adult population to
"reading only what is fit for children."'l05 Thus, the
two justices concluded, the Court effectively reduced the content of public broadcasts to material
suitable for minors; in their opinion, The decision
of whether children should listen to indecent speech
on the radio would best be left to their parents.
One of the dissent's major objections to the
Court's decision concerned the imposition of a
99Id at 21.

majoritarian conception of decency on the minority. Brennan cited ethnocentric cultural studies for
the proposition that many of the words contained
in Carlin's monologue were used in everyday conversations among several subcultures.' 6 Therefore,
Brennan predicted that the Court's decision would
have its greatest impact on broadcasters attempting to reach these subcultures and on members of
these subcultures who want to listen to those broadcasters.
Justice Stewart, in a dissent joined by Brennan,
White, and Marshall, criticized the Pacifica majority's interpretation of Sections 1461107 and 1464.208
Finding the legislative history to be silent on
whether the words "indecent" and "obscene" were
intended to have separate meaning under section
1464, Stewart concluded that both statutes must
be construed similarly. The four dissenters thus
contended that the majority had violated a fundamental precept of constitutional adjudication:
"the need to construe an Act of Congress so as to
avoid,
,, 1° 9 if possible, passing upon its constitutionality.

ANALYSIS

The dissenters' criticism of Pacifica demonstrates
that indecent speech is differentiated from obscene
speech by the absence of a prurient appeal in the
former and the presence of such an appeal in the
latter. Further, speech reviewed for either an obscene or indecent content is evaluated within the
context of its potential audience, which resulted in
the inclusion of children in Pacifica,and the exclusion of children, but the inclusion of sensitive
adults, in Pinkus. Thus, the differences which existed between the methods of dissemination of the
indecent speech in Pacfica and the obscene speech
alleged in Pinkus explain the majority's concern for
children in Pacficaand lack of concern for children
in Pinkus.

In Pinkus, an adamant, slim majority"0 sought
to refine an established legal concept which the
10698 S. Ct. at 3054 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing B.

GEr YOUR Ass

100Id.

JACKSON,

101Id.
1i Id.

ME (1974); J.

'03 98 S. Ct. at 3050 (Brennan, J.,'dissenting). Brennan
stated that, "Because the Carlin monologue is obviously
not an erotic appeal to the prurient interest of children,
the Court, for the first time, allows the government to
prevent minors from gaining access to materials that are
not obscene, and are therefore protected, as to them." Id.
'04 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
'5 Id. at 383.

LABOY,

INTHE WATER AND SWIM LIKE

DILLARD, BLACK ENGLISH

LANGUAGE

(1972); and W.

IN THE INNER CITY: STUDIES

IN THE

BLACK ENGLISH VERNACULAR (1972)).

10718 U.S.C. § 1461.
108Id

'09 98 S. Ct. at 3055 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
"o ChiefJustice Burger and Justices Blackmun, White,
Rehnquist and Powell did not express a desire to change
the underlying law of obscenity; Justices Stevens, Bren-

nan, Stewart and Marshall did express such a desire.'
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minority preferred to discard. Given the predilections of the members of the Court, the majority's
decision to exclude children and include sensitive
persons in defining the relevant community was
predictable. The Roth standards required that a
jury view the challenged material through the eyes
of the "average person" in the community. Later,
the GinsbergCourt ruled that where materials were
made available to children, ajury properly considered the material's prurient appeal to youth."'
That Court held that a state may proscribe the sale
of material to children when the material appealed
to the prurient interest of youth, even though that
material was protected in its distribution to consenting adults. 11 2 Such materials may possess obscene qualities in the eyes of the young, but only
indecent qualities in the eyes of adults. Examples
would include materials which lie at the periphery
of protected adult matter. Therefore, in all probability, Pinkus properly held that a jury should not
consider children when the challenged material
will be available to adults but not to youth.
Although the Court has not had the "occasion
to decide what effect Millerwill have on the Ginsberg
formulation,"" 3 the exclusion of children from the
relevant community for the determination of obscenity vel non of adult material should be equally
as applicable under Miller as under Roth. The Miller
Court adopted the "contemporary community
standards""" criteria of Roth and its progeny, making this definitional aspect of obscenity identical
under both standards." 5 Similarly, the Court's inclusion of sensitive adults in its definition of the
average person in the community was consonant
with prior decisions, and should find equal applicability under both the Roth and Miller standards.
The problem with the majority's approach to
obscenity in Pinkur is that no matter how precisely
the Court defines the attributes of the average
man, at least in the context of obscenity, the jury's
decision will continue to be plagued by subjective
inconsistencies. These inconsistencies are compounded when a jury, striving to envision that
".390 U.S. at 638.
12Id at 634-35.
' Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. at 213
n.10.
n4 413 U.S. at 24.
1.r Although the Roth standards, as particularized in
Menoirs, do not explicitly state that a jury must apply an
"average man" standard, as stated in Miller, the Pinkus
decision makes it clear that the "average man" standard
is to be used when applying the Roth test for determining
obscenity vel non. See Pink=, 98 S. Ct. at 1812-14.

chimerical "average man," is required to include
in that formulation the material's prurient appeal
to abnormal groups. These inescapable inconsistencies have been the focus of Justice Stevens' criticisms, and the moving force in his efforts to have
criminal sanctions removed from obscenity law.
Justices Brennan, Stewart and Marshall have
posited more manageable standards for the regulation of obscene materials. They would regulate
the conduct of disseminators of allegedly obscene
material, but not the content of that material.
They maintain that one should be free to disseminate or receive materials, regardless of content "at
least in the absence of distribution to juveniles ' or6
obstructive exposure to consenting adults.""1
While this standard at first may appear easy to
implement, its effect may move the focus of this
difficult area of the law from the problems encountered in separating the indecent from the obscene
to the closely related difficulties involved in determining "obstructive exposure" vel non and deciding
what material is inappropriate for juveniles. That
is, the standards for determining 'obstructive exposure' and suitability for youth will be analogous
to the obscenity standards announced in Miller.
The Court's reluctance in Pacifica to identify
standards applicable to the determination of indecency vel non indicates that the law of indecency
will also remain unsettled in years, to come- Moreover, in holding the Carlin monologue indecent,
the Court attached a meaning to "indecent speech"
which encompassed more than a possible appeal to
a prurient interest." 7 What the Court did state in
Paficawas that its basic predisposition, supporting
the right of parents to rear their children as they
wish and protecting the home from offensive intrusions, will permeate the law of indecency. These
concerns have weighed heavily in the area of obscenity, where decisions such as Ginsberg"8 and
Rowan" 9 have established them as clear boundaries
on the distribution of sexually offensive materials.
The Ginsberg Court held that a state's constitutional power to regulate the dissemination of offensive materials to youth was premised on two justifications: the state's respect for the right of parents
to raise their children as they deem proper2m and
the state's independent interest in the well being of
"'Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. at 113
(Brennan,
Stewart and Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
17 See 98 S.Ct. at 3050 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
"8 390 U.S. 629.

n9 397 U.S. 728.
m 390 U.S. at 639.
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its youth.' ' The Pacifica Court -incorporated both
of these interests into the law of indecency by
allowing the FCC to regulate the Carlin monologue
"as broadcast."' 2 It was only by confining Paciflca
to the speech "as broadcast" that the decision may
have been consistent with Erznoznik v. City ofJack-

sonville,'2 3 where the Court held that a statute
prohibiting a motion picture, containing any nude
scenes, from being exhibited if the screen was visible from any public place, was "broader than
permissible" under the first amendment. 24 Therefore, the Pacifica decision cannot be read to allow
the FCC to proscribe all offensive speech.
The Pacifica Court's reliance on Rowan'2 5 for the
proposition that an individual's privacy interest
supported the FCC action was not as well founded
as its protection of children rationale. In Rowan,
the Court held that a statute which allowed an
individual to censor his own mail did not offend
the first amendment rights of the mailor. The
Pacifcadecision, however, removed that exercise of
choice from the individual and placed it with a
govermental agency.' 26 Such a decision could only
be justified by the Court's explicit adoption of a
standard which extended varying degrees of first
amendment protection
to different modes of com27
munication.'
The concern for privacy and the protection of
children provided the basis for the narrow Pacifca
decision: offensive speech may be restricted from
entering the home of an unwilling audience or an
audience compiled of children. 128 The problem
121Id. at

640. See also
Pacfica, 98 S. Ct. at 3035-36.
term, "as broadcast," must be read as relating
to that particular time of the day when children are likely
to be in the audience.
'22The

'23

422 U.S. 205 (1975).

'2Id.at

213.
98 S.Ct. at 3040. (citing 397 U.S. 728).
r26Justice Stevens wrote for the Court in Pacfica,
upholding the FCC's regulation of indecent speech. This
is contrary to the "marketplace" approach he has
adopted with respect to obscenity law. See Smith v.
United States, 431 U.S. 291, 311 (1977) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting), Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 198
(1977) (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting) and
Splawn v. California, 431 U.S. 595, 602 (1977) (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
'2 See Pacfica, 98 S.Ct. at 3039-40, stating that, of all
forms of communication, radio broadcast has received
the most limited first amendment protection (citing Joseph Burnstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952):
"Each method [of communication] tends to present its
own peculiar problems." Idat 503).
2 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971). The
Cohen Court upheld the right of a person to use offensive
language, in a public place, to express a political opinion.
'2

[Vol. 69

with the Court's decision was that it provided no
standards for determining indecency vel non, leaving that judgment to the FCC. Future cases will
undoubtedly impel the law of indecency toward
the same definitional problems which have plagued
the law of obscenity. The problem is further compounded in the law of indecent speech by the fact
that speakers' opinions receive protection, but the
words used to express those opinions may be subject
to restrictions.1 2 The law of obscenity avoids this
dilemma by focusing on prurient appeal alone, and
not on the method of communicating that appeal. 13°
Pacificaimplied that, in different "contexts," the
author must use different language to express the
same idea. However, the Court has previously recognized the dangers of such a requirement, stating
in Cohen v. California that "we cannot indulge the
facile assumption that one can forbid particular
words without also running a substantial risk of
suppressing ideas in the process.", 3 ' Further, requiring that an author select his language to suit
the context of his speech may often result in a
"sterilized message,"' 2 devoid of the author's personality and failing to "convey the emotion that 1is
an essential part of so many communications."'
Justice Brennan alluded to these communication
difficulties in his Pacificadissent, when he spoke of
the Court's neglect for the concerns of ethnocentric
subcultures whose speech commonly included
words which the majority of the country would
find offensive.ls Such concerns will raise in the
future the issue of the relevant geographic community to be considered in determining the indecency vel non of a broadcast. The Miller Court held
that in determining obscenity vel non, a jury may
not be instructed to apply a national community
standard1ss However, an anomalous situation is
created by the FCC's role in determining the indecency vel non of a broadcast, because that deterSee Pacifica, 98 S.Ct. at 3038-39.
In Roth and subsequent obscenity decisions the
Court has held that the trier of fact must instruct the
jury to consider a work as a whole in determining the
prurient appeal vel non of that challenged material. 354
U.S. at 489.
131
403 U.S. at 26.
"2 98 S.Ct. at 3053 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
' Id Justice Brennan also contends that, even though
the Court's decision does not prevent an adult from
purchasing the Carlin record or attending one of his live
performances, interested listeners may be precluded from
this material by their own financial constraints.
13Id at 3054 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
'-'413 U.S. at 30.
i29
'30
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mination is not dependent upon "lay jurors."'6
This difference would seem to allow the Federal
Communications Commission to adopt a national
standard.
Therefore, the geographic boundaries of the relevant public broadcast community should be established, logically, by the station's physical br6adcast range. That community should be comprised
of all persons, including children, who might be
expected to be in the audience at the time of the
broadcast. This conclusion is compelled by the
Court's analogous decision in Pinkus, where the
availability of the challenged material to sensitive
persons and the inaccessibility of children to that
material dictated that the former group be included, and the latter group excluded, from the
jury's evaluation of that material.
136I.

CONCLUSION

Pacifica demonstrates that the regulation of offensive speech, even if based on the mode of dissemination of that material, cannot avoid at least a
cursory review of the content of that material.
Indeed, it is the content of the material which
determines the permissible time, manner and place
of its dissemination. 3 7 The disharmony within the
Court, evidenced by the Pinkus obscenity holding
and the Pacifica indecency decision, suggests that
the Court will not be able to establish standards
relating offensive materials to their permissible
modes of distribution which will satisfy more than
a slight majority of the members of the Court.
137 It must be recognized that, under the present obscenity standards, there are no permissible modes for
disseminating materials which are found to be obscene.
See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).

